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Abstract	
The	European	Union	institutions	have	always	taken	an	interest	in	their	own	internal	governance.	In	
the	1990s,	this	 interest	began	to	be	characterised	by	a	greater	reflexivity,	 increasingly	allied	to	the	
concept	 of	 ‘good	 governance’.	 One	 example	 of	 this	 was	 in	 the	 field	 of	 public	 ethics	 where	 the	
European	Commission	came	to	 recognise	 the	 importance	of	establishing	structures	and	policies	 to	
govern	 the	conduct	of	public	 servants	 (whether	MEPs,	Commissioners	or	EU	officials).	Drawing	on	
historical	 institutionalism,	 this	 article	 considers	 the	emergence	and	evolution	of	 the	Commission’s	
public	ethics	system	after	1999.	The	article	distinguishes	between	the	formative	and	post-formative	
stage	in	the	system’s	emergence	and	evolution,	arguing	that	in	both	periods,	structural	factors	and	
agency,	both	externally	and	internally,	were	important	in	explaining	institutional	change.	What	was	
especially	 important	 in	 the	 formative	 period,	 however,	 was	 the	 intensity	 of	 the	 primary	 external	
driver	 of	 change,	 which	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 European	 Commission	was	 the	 scandal	 over	 unethical	
conduct	and	mismanagement	which	hit	the	institution	in	1998-9.	
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For	 six	 decades,	 scholars	 have	 attempted	 to	 map	 and	 explain	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 European	
integration	process.	Much	of	 the	 focus	of	 this	 research	 in	 recent	decades	has	 taken	as	 its	 starting	
point	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 system	 of	 European	 governance,	 which	 Tömmel	 (in	 this	 volume)	 has	
identified	as	comprising	four	phases.	The	concomitant	‘governance	turn’	in	the	academic	literature,	
which	emerged	in	the	1980s,	has	dissected	this	evolution,	making	a	major	contribution	to	the	study	
of	European	Union	(EU)	politics	and	policy-making.	At	the	same	time,	it	has	also	allowed	researchers	
to	reflect	at	length	on	the	distinctive	characteristics	of	EU	governance.		
While	debates	on	modes	of	EU	governance,	the	particularities	of	European	policy	regimes,	the	role	
of	expertise,	and	the	challenges	involved	in	addressing	the	EU’s	democratic	deficit	have	dominated	
the	 governance	 agenda,	 a	 less	 developed	 strand	 of	 governance	 research	 has	 emerged	 on	 ‘good	
governance’	or	the	‘quality	of	governance’	(Huberts	2014).	Good	governance	tends	to	rest	on	a	set	
of	 rather	 abstract	but	worthy	principles	 such	as	 reliability,	 transparency,	 impartiality	 and	honesty.	
These	principles	carry	within	them	normative	assumptions	about	what	constitutes	the	‘good’	in	good	
governance.	 Administrative	 reforms	 are	 often	 concerned	 therefore	 with	 translating	 general	
principles	into	workable	aspects	of	public	policies	or	the	governing	systems	that	underpin	them	(see,	
for	example,	Huberts	2014).	Public	ethics	is	one	such	area	of	activity,	and	is	the	focus	of	this	article.	
‘Ethics’	 in	 this	 context	 refers	not	only	 to	 the	standards	and	principles	 that	 shape	 the	behaviour	of	
individuals	and	groups,	but	also	to	the	institutional	rules	that	allow	these	principles	to	be	translated	
into	practice.	It	is	situational	and	concerned	with	role	morality	rather	than	universal	values	(Năstase	
2013).	Public	ethics	 involves	the	application	of	these	standards	and	principles	to	politicians,	office-
holders	and	civil	servants	through	the	establishment	of	ethics	systems.	In	this	article	the	focus	is	on	
an	administrative	ethics	system.	Since	the	1990s,	many	public	organisations	in	Europe	have	begun	to	
develop	such	systems.	They	have	done	 this	by	adopting	ethical	principles,	ethics	 rules	or	 codes	of	
conduct,	by	 introducing	ethics	 training	and	by	 requiring	staff	 to	complete	declarations	 listing	 their	
financial	and	other	 interests.	Ethics	systems	comprise	therefore	the	universe	of	structures,	policies	
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and	 rules,	 underpinned	 by	 explicit	 principles	 and	 standards,	 designed	 to	 improve	 the	 conduct	 of	
individuals	 and	 groups	 as	 they	 perform	 their	 specific	 roles	 and	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 quality	 of	
governance.		
This	article	focuses	on	public	ethics	in	the	European	Commission.	It	examines	the	gradual	process	by	
which	the	ethics	system	emerged	and	evolved	during	two	distinctive	periods,	1999-2004	and	2005-
2011.	The	focus	on	public	ethics	is	justified	given	the	limited	research	conducted	on	this	issue	in	the	
context	of	the	EU	institutions	and	the	sensitive	and	contested	nature	of	ethics	reforms,	which	offer	a	
fertile	testing	ground	for	research	on	the	drivers	of	institutional	change.	
The	 article	 argues	 that	 in	 both	 the	 formative	 and	post-formative	 periods	 institutional	 change	was	
driven	by	structural	factors	and	reform	agents,	both	external	and	internal	to	the	Commission.	What	
distinguished	 the	 formative	 period,	 however,	 was	 the	 intensity	 of	 the	 primary	 external	 driver	 of	
change,	which	in	the	case	of	the	European	Commission	was	the	scandal	over	unethical	conduct	and	
mismanagement	 which	 hit	 the	 institution	 in	 1998-9.	 Thus,	 the	 article	 argues	 that	 to	 understand	
institutional	 change	 it	 is	 important	 not	 only	 to	 identify	which	 factors	 are	 important,	 but	 also	 the	
qualities	embodied	 in	 those	 factors.	This	argument	draws	 from	a	body	of	 research	on	 institutional	
change	 that	has	emerged	out	of	earlier	work	on	historical	 institutionalism	 (for	example,	Mahoney	
and	 Thelen	 2010;	 Pierson	 2004;	 Rittberger	 2003).	 It	 adds	 to	 this	 literature	 by	 highlighting	 the	
importance	of	the	intensity	of	external	drivers	at	the	formative	stage,	while	rejecting	the	assumption	
made	in	early	institutionalist	research	that	the	drivers	of	change	differ	substantially	at	the	formative	
and	post-formative	stages	of	institutional	change.	
The	article	also	draws	on	a	broader	 literature	on	administrative	ethics	 (for	example,	Cooper	2001;	
Huberts,	Maesschalk	and	Jurkiewicz	2008;	Lawton	1998)	as	well	as	on	the	few	studies	that	address	
the	EU	institutions	(such	as	Cini	2007;	Dercks	2001:	Hine	and	McMahon	2004;	Năstase	2013).	Both	
Năstase	 (2013)	and	Cini	 (2014)	have	applied	 institutionalist	approaches	 to	earlier	 studies	of	public	
ethics	 in	 the	 European	 Commission.	 This	 article	 complements	 these	 studies,	 by	 offering	 new	
empirical	 material,	 and	 further	 developing	 the	 application	 of	 institutional	 theory	 by	 focusing	
attention	on	the	drivers	of	institutional	change.	The	empirical	sections	of	the	article	are	drawn	from	
primary	documents	and	from	interviews	which	the	author	conducted	in	the	European	Commission	in	
2006	and	2011.	
The	article	begins	by	explaining	 the	concept	of	 institutional	 change	which	 is	 found	 in	 the	 relevant	
theoretical	 literature	 on	 historical	 institutionalism,	 and	 by	 identifying	 a	 simple	 framework	 which	
guides	 the	 empirical	 sections	 below.	By	way	of	 contextualising	 the	 research,	 it	 then	discusses	 the	
origins	and	content	of	the	‘good	governance	turn’	of	the	1990s	and	2000s,	focusing	particularly	on	
the	 European	 Commission.	 The	 third	 section	 then	 provides	 a	 more	 detailed	 empirical/narrative	
account	of	this	‘turn’	by	examining	formative	change	in	the	shape	of	the	establishment	of	an	ethics	
system	 for	 EU	 officials	 after	 1999.	 The	 fourth	 section	 adopts	 the	 same	 approach	 for	 the	 post-
formative	change	after	2005,	after	which	a	concluding	section	draws	out	the	argument.	
	
HISTORICAL	INSTITUTIONALISM	AND	INSTITUTIONAL	CHANGE	
The	 theoretical	 aim	 of	 this	 article	 is	 to	 explain	 which	 drivers	 are	 important	 in	 accounting	 for	
institutional	 change	 (see	 also,	 in	 this	 issue,	 Eckert,	Maas	 and	 Stephenson).	 Institutional	 change	 is	
defined	 here	 as	 a	 broad	 church	 encompassing	 the	 establishment	 of	 institutions	 (formative	
institutional	 change	 or	 simply	 formative	 change),	 and	 the	 reconfiguration	 of	 existing	 institutions	
(post-formative	 institutional	 change	 or	 post-formative	 change).	 A	 third	 category,	 incremental	
institutional	 change,	which	 is	 a	more	 gradualist	 process	 of	 change,	 is	 not	 discussed	 in	 this	 article.	
Institutional	change	has	been	a	difficult	subject	for	new	institutionalists.	It	is	especially	problematic	
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for	 rational	 choice	 and	 sociological	 (or	 normative)	 institutionalism	 as	 these	 approaches	 rest	 on	
equilibrium	 assumptions.	 Historical	 institutionalism	 has	 shown	 more	 promise.	 It	 emphasises	 the	
importance	 of	 either	 grand	 institution-forming	 ruptures	 or	 relatively	 incremental	 path	 dependent	
trajectories.	In	the	case	of	the	latter,	an	internal	dynamic	drives	institutional	development;	whilst	for	
the	 former,	 institutional	 change	 is	 driven	 primarily	 by	 external	 (exogenous)	 shocks	 which	 force	
breaks	 with	 past	 practice.	 This	 usually	 involves	 a	 de-legitimisation	 of	 earlier	 institutional	
arrangements	and	the	forging	of	a	critical	juncture	which	opens	a	window	of	opportunity	for	reform	
agents	to	promote	new	institutional	arrangements	(Thelen,	Steinmo	and	Longstreth	1992).	
A	new	wave	of	institutionalism	reflects	dissatisfaction	with	early	historical	institutionalist	accounts	of	
institutional	change,	however.	Thus,	alternative	explanations	now	draw	attention	to	a	broader	range	
of	factors	that	might	explain	institutional	change.	Mahoney	and	Thelen’s	(2010)	work,	for	example,	
points	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 processes	 at	work,	 including	what	 they	 term	 as	 ‘layering’	 and	 ‘exhaustion’.	
Others	demonstrate	how	‘change	agency’	or	‘institutional	entrepreneurship’	(Levy	and	Scully	2007;	
Mahoney	 &	 Thelen	 2010:	 22-27;	 Rao,	 Morrill	 and	 Zald	 2000:	 240)	 have	 been	 underplayed	 in	
historical	institutional	accounts	of	institutional	change.	
The	 main	 fault	 lines	 in	 identifying	 the	 drivers	 of	 institutional	 change	 revolve	 around	 the	
structure/agency	 and	 internal/external	 dichotomies.	 This	 rather	 simplistic	 distinction	 is	 used	 as	 a	
basic	heuristic	 framework	 for	 this	article,	notwithstanding	that	 institutional	change	 is	most	 likely	a	
complex	phenomenon	and	its	origins	multi-causal.	
Figure	1:	Drivers	of	Institutional	Change	
	 External	 Internal	
Structure	 A	 B	
Agency	 C	 D	
	
Figure	1	presents	the	four	potential	drivers	examined	in	this	article.	In	this	schema,	external	drivers	
include	the	kind	of	shocks	that	result	from	scandal	and	intense	media	attention	(A),	but	also	include	
external	 institutional	 pressure	 from	 individual	 or	 collective	 actors	 (C).	 Internal	 drivers,	 for	 the	
purposes	of	this	article,	are	factors	that	are	internal	to	the	organisation	within	which	the	institution	
(policy,	system	or	regime)	is	located.	They	might	include	the	actions	of	reform	agents	(D),	or	a	path	
dependent	logic	that	results	from	the	sunk	costs	associated	with	existing	institutional	practices	(C).	
Structural	 factors	 are	 rules,	 institutions,	 practices	 and	 cultures;	 while	 agency	 is	 an	 attribute	 of	
individual	or	collective	actors,	and	concerns	their	capacity	to	act	(independently).	
	
THE	EU	‘GOOD	GOVERNANCE	TURN’	IN	CONTEXT	
For	 much	 of	 its	 history,	 the	 Commission	 was	 distinguished	 by	 its	 technocratic	 approach	 to	
governance,	which	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 Jean	Monnet’s	 administrative	 organisation	 in	 the	 1950s	
(Fransen	 1999;	 Radaelli	 1999:	 31).	 This	 reflected	 the	 early	 bias	 of	 Community	 policy	 towards	
regulation.	 However,	 Monnet’s	 model	 failed	 to	 gain	 the	 acceptance	 of	 the	 Community	 member	
states	 (Duchene	 1994:	 214;	Monnet	 1978:	 245)	 and	by	 the	 time	 the	 EEC	was	 established	 in	 1958	
there	 was	 little	 expectation	 that	 the	 EU	 Administration	 would	 take	 anything	 other	 than	 a	
bureaucratic	form.	Yet	the	kind	of	bureaucracy	the	Commission	became	was	still	one	imbued	with	a	
particular	 technocratic	 ideology	 and	 practice	 (Radaelli	 1999:	 194),	 one	 which	 emphasised	 the	
importance	of	efficiency,	expertise,	elites	and	functional	interest	intermediation,	and	which	had	little	
to	say	about	democratic	accountability,	openness	and	representation.	
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It	was	not	until	the	early	1990s	that	the	Commission	began	to	come	to	terms	with	the	disaffection	
many	ordinary	citizens	in	Europe	were	feeling	towards	the	European	integration	project	(see	van	der	
Veen,	this	 issue).	A	change	in	the	discourse	emerged,	gradually	followed	by	some	alteration,	albeit	
limited,	 to	 Commission	 practice.	 Institutional	 rigidities	 formed	 barriers	 to	 fundamental	 change	
however	(Haines	2003-4).	The	Commission	was	not	only	set	in	its	ways	structurally	and	procedurally,	
but	 it	 also	 suffered	 from	 an	 organisational	 culture	 that	 was	 extremely	 resistant	 to	 change	 (for	
example,	Abélès,	Bellier	&	McDonald	1993;	Bellier	1995).	
This	did	not	necessarily	stop	the	Commission	from	proposing	initiatives	to	improve	the	quality	of	EU	
governance,	 however.	 Indeed,	 by	 2000,	 European	 governance	 comprised	 one	 of	 its	 four	 strategic	
objectives.	 This	 led	 to	 the	 publication	 in	 2001	 of	 the	 White	 Paper	 on	 European	 Governance	
(European	Commission	2001).	Its	objective	was	to	bring	the	EU	closer	to	its	citizens	by	improving	the	
effectiveness	and	democratic	legitimacy	of	EU	policy	and	policy-making.	The	White	Paper	identified	
five	 principles	 of	 good	 governance	 –	 openness,	 participation,	 accountability,	 effectiveness	 and	
coherence	(European	Commission	2001:	10).	It	sought	to	encourage	closer	relations	with	both	local	
and	 regional	 actors	 and	 with	 civil	 society	 organisations	 in	 the	 design	 and	 implementation	 of	
European	policy,	and	to	promote	improvements	in	the	quality	of	European	legislation.	The	approach	
emphasised	the	 importance	of	 inputs	 into	the	policy	process,	particularly	 in	the	form	of	enhancing	
participation	(Börzel,	Pamuk	&	Stahn	2008:	21).	
The	agenda	promoted	by	the	Commission	included	a	permanent	dialogue	with	civil	society	and	the	
introduction	of	a	new	European	Citizens’	Initiative,	which	for	the	first	time	allowed	citizens	(backed	
by	 one	million	 signatures)	 to	 propose	 legislation	 in	 an	 area	 in	 which	 the	 EU	 had	 competence.	 It	
involved	a	communications	policy	which	set	a	new	tone	as	it	was	designed	with	the	aim	of	listening	
and	explaining	better.	The	agenda	also	supported	 initiatives	of	 longer	standing	which	 included	the	
promotion	of	subsidiarity	to	strengthen	the	role	of	regional	and	local	actors	in	EU	policy-making,	and	
the	extension	of	the	powers	of	the	European	Parliament	which	allowed	representative	democracy	to	
continue	to	evolve	in	parallel	with	the	new	focus	on	participatory	democracy	(European	Commission	
2001).	
While	it	took	the	lead	in	promoting	these	good	governance	initiatives,	the	Commission	was	also	still	
seen	as	part	of	the	problem.	Composed	of	two	distinct	component	parts,	the	administrative	services	
and	 the	 political	 executive	 (Cram	 1999),	 the	 Commission’s	 functions	 reflect	 the	 tension	 between	
these	two	elements.	The	explicitly	political	functions	of	the	Commission	have	generally	been	held	in	
higher	 esteem	 than	 the	 Commission’s	 administrative	 functions.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 institution	
prided	itself	on	performing	its	policy	tasks	exceptionally	well,	seeing	no	incentive	in	addressing	the	
more	mundane	administrative	and	management	problems	which	had	been	 identified	 in	 reports	as	
far	back	as	the	1960s.	Yet	management	problems	affected	the	quality	of	policy	implementation,	an	
important	aspect	of	good	governance.	With	success	judged	more	in	terms	of	legislative	output	than	
on	whether	the	objective	of	the	legislation	was	ultimately	achieved,	the	flipside	of	the	Commission’s	
prioritisation	 of	 policy-making	 became	 its	 ‘management	 deficit’	 (Metcalfe	 1996).	 It	was	 only	 after	
1999	that	this	issue	began	to	be	addressed	though	a	major	reform	of	the	Commission	(2000-2004).	
The	reform	emphasised	the	importance	of	throughputs	within	the	governance	process	and	directed	
attention	to	how	the	Commission’s	own	internal	systems	and	the	conduct	of	its	staff	might	improve,	
as	a	core	element	in	the	promotion	of	good	governance.	One	way	in	which	this	was	translated	into	
concrete	policy	was	through	the	introduction	of	a	new	Commission	ethics	system.	
	
THE	EUROPEAN	COMMISSION’S	ETHICS	SYSTEM	1999-2004:	FORMATIVE	CHANGE	
The	resignation	of	the	College	of	Commissioners	in	March	1999	was	a	critical	moment	in	the	history	
of	 the	European	Union,	 the	product	of	a	deepening	malaise	 felt	by	European	citizens	 towards	 the	
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Brussels-based	 bureaucracy.	 In	 the	 months	 before	 and	 after	 the	 resignation,	 there	 was	 much	
discussion	in	Brussels	and	in	the	media	as	to	how	the	Commission	had	to	change.	Most	of	this	took	
the	form	of	a	diagnosis	of	the	Commission’s	problems.	While	the	Commission	was	presented	with	a	
clean	sheet	of	paper	on	which	to	construct	its	own	reform,	the	discretion	available	to	it	at	this	time	
should	 not	 be	 exaggerated	 as	 the	 political	 context	 precluded	 any	 extensive	 period	 of	 reflection.	
Indeed,	on	his	nomination	as	President	of	the	European	Commission	at	the	Berlin	European	Council	
in	March	1999,	Romano	Prodi	had	no	choice	but	to	act	quickly.	As	the	Presidency	Conclusions	put	it:	
The	 new	 Commission	 should	 speedily	 put	 into	 effect	 the	 necessary	 reforms	 ...	 for	 the	
improvement	 of	 its	 organisation,	 management	 and	 financial	 control	 ...	 launching	 a	
programme	of	far	reaching	modernisation	and	reform	...	to	ensure	[the]	highest	standards	of	
management,	integrity	and	efficiency	(European	Council	1999).	
Capitalising	 on	 a	wave	of	 reform-mania,	 Prodi	 launched	his	 presidency	with	 a	 range	of	 initiatives,	
many	 of	 which	 had	 been	 included	 in	 the	 recommendations	 of	 the	 Independent	 Experts’	 Second	
Report	(CIE	1999),	published	in	September	1999.	Some	of	these	initiatives	had	ethical	 implications.	
For	 example,	 from	 mid-1999,	 Prodi	 revised	 the	 codes	 of	 conduct	 drafted	 earlier	 in	 the	 year	
(European	Commission	1999)	and	addressed	the	Commission’s	‘culture	of	immobility’	by	reshuffling	
senior	staff	and	limiting,	to	between	five	and	seven	years,	the	time	senior	officials	could	remain	 in	
the	 same	 post.	 He	 made	 sure	 that	 Commissioners	 were	 prepared	 to	 offer	 their	 resignations	 if	
requested	 to	 do	 so;	 and	 changed	 the	 system	 of	 appointing	 Commissioners’	 personal	 offices	
(cabinets)	to	minimise	nepotism	and	favouritism	(Nugent	2001:	56;	Peterson	2000:	17-18;	Stevens	&	
Stevens	2001:	103:	197:460).	
Prodi’s	decision	to	allocate	the	reform	portfolio	 to	Neil	Kinnock	was	both	pragmatic	and	symbolic.	
Although	there	was	some	criticism	that	he	was	too	closely	associated	with	the	previous	(discredited)	
Commission	(Westlake	2001:	696-700),	it	was	important	that	the	reform	job	should	go	to	someone	
who	was	already	familiar	with	how	the	Commission	operated.	Kinnock	had	his	own	ideas	about	what	
was	wrong	with	 the	 Commission,	 and	 recognised	 that	what	was	 needed	was	 a	 ‘root	 and	 branch’	
reform,	rather	than	a	minor	adjustment	that	did	little	more	than	pay	lip-service	to	the	Commission’s	
critics.	Kinnock	hit	 the	ground	 running,	putting	 together	a	 reform	team	which	by	 January	2000,	 in	
the	space	of	nineteen	weeks,	produced	a	consultative	document,	and	by	March	2000,	 the	seminal	
White	Paper	on	Administrative	Reform	(European	Commission	2000a	and	2000b).	
At	 both	 the	 political	 and	 administrative	 levels,	 those	 involved	 in	 the	 reform	 recognised	 the	
importance	of	taking	advice	from	outside	the	Commission.	They	consulted	experts	with	experience	
of	private	and	public	sector	administration	both	 in	Europe	and	elsewhere.	They	also	sought	advice	
from	 international	 organisations	 including	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 the	 Organization	 for	 Economic	
Cooperation	 and	 Development	 (OECD)	 and	 professional	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 International	
Institute	of	Auditors.	The	aim	was	to	benchmark	the	ideas	circulating	at	the	time	in	the	Commission	
and	to	provide	a	sounding	board	for	Commission	initiatives	(Kassim	2004:	42).	
Organisation	 was	 important;	 but	 so	 too	 was	 communication.	 This	 was	 important	 as	 there	 was	
resistance	to	change	from	within	the	Commission.	Some	felt	that	aspects	of	the	reform	constituted	
an	attack	on	the	rights	and	conditions	of	the	Commission	administration,	deflecting	attention	away	
from	 the	 Commissioners	 who	 held	 political	 responsibility;	 others	 expressed	 concern	 that	 with	 its	
emphasis	on	management,	 the	 reform	constituted	a	 rejection	of	 the	 institution’s	political	mission.	
Yet	 another	 perspective	 saw	 the	 reform	 as	 the	 rejection	 of	 the	 original	 Franco-German	model	 of	
administration	 in	 favour	 of	 a	Nordic	 or	 an	Anglo-Saxon	model	 (interviews	 1	 and	2;	Dorandeu	 and	
Georgakakis	2002).	Yet,	despite	opposition	there	were	also	voices	heard	within	 the	Commission	 in	
support	of	the	reform,	officials	pleased	to	see	the	end	of	practices	associated	with	the	Commission’s	
pre-reform	culture	(Kinnock	2003).	
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The	 ‘human	 resources’	 dimension	 of	 the	 reform	 took	 the	 form	 of	 an	 overhaul	 of	 the	 EU	 Staff	
Regulations.	 Because	 of	 the	 need	 to	 achieve	 an	 inter-institutional	 consensus,	 this	 aspect	 of	 the	
reform	was	one	of	the	most	contentious.	Title	II	of	the	Staff	Regulations,	dealing	with	the	rights	and	
obligations	 of	 officials	 covers	 a	 range	 of	 potential	 conflicts	 of	 interests	 that	 could	 potentially	 be	
faced	by	Commission	and	other	EU	civil	 servants,	 focusing	 in	particular	on	 issues	of	 independence	
and	discretion,	freedom	of	expression,	outside	activities,	spousal	interests,	whistleblowing	and	post-
employment	obligations.	This	part	of	the	Regulations	was	rewritten	in	the	period	between	2000	and	
2003.	
Ensuring	 high	 standards	 of	 ethical	 conduct	 is	 particularly	 important	 where	 financial	 matters	 are	
concerned.	 Reforms	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 financial	 accountability,	 control	 and	 internal	 audit	
frameworks	 necessitated	 a	 revision	 of	 the	 EU’s	 Financial	 Regulation	 (EU	 Council/European	
Parliament	 2002).	 Ethical	 considerations	 were	 once	 again	 deeply	 integrated	 within	 the	 broader	
changes	proposed	 (Kinnock	2001;	Kinnock	2002:	21-28),	with	 the	aim	of	 constructing	a	 ‘culture	of	
responsibility’	 within	 the	 Commission.	 The	 Directors-General	 heading	 the	 Commission’s	
administrative	 services	 were	 to	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 guaranteeing	 ethical	 standards,	 through	 the	
practical	and	symbolic	significance	of	putting	their	signature	to	an	Annual	Declaration,	an	act	which	
arguably	sat	at	the	very	centre	of	the	Commission’s	new	ethics	system	(Cini	2007:	135).	
At	 the	 centre	 of	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 work	 were	 the	 twenty-four	 Internal	 Control	
Standards	(ICS).	These	were	based	on	international	guidelines	which	had	been	developed	in	1992	by	
the	 Committee	 of	 the	 Sponsoring	 Organizations	 of	 the	 Treadway	 Commission,	 known	 more	
commonly	as	COSO,	representing	US	organisations	interested	in	anti-fraud,	control	and	audit-related	
issues.	 These	 guidelines	 were	 disseminated	 within	 the	 public	 sector	 by	 INTOSAI,	 the	 umbrella	
organisation	 for	 the	 government	 audit	 community.	 It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	 latter’s	 guidelines	
were	amended	in	2001	to	include	ethics	as	one	of	the	four	objectives	of	internal	control	(along	with	
economy,	efficiency	and	effectiveness).	But	even	before	this,	in	2000,	the	Commission’s	first	control	
standard,	 ICS-1,	 reflected	 a	 burgeoning	 interest	 in	 ethics.	 The	 standard	 had	 the	 specific	 aim	 of	
ensuring	that	officials	were	aware	of	the	ethics	rules	(European	Commission	2001:	7).	
Although	ethics	was	largely	integrated	within	the	wider	reform,	there	were	also	a	number	of	discrete	
initiatives	set	out	in	the	White	Paper’s	Action	Plan	(European	Commission	2000b).	At	least	ten	out	of	
a	total	of	98	actions	dealt	with	ethical	issues,	though	Hine	and	MacMahon	claim	that	more,	around	
half	of	 the	actions,	had	a	 significant	ethical	dimension	 (Hine	and	McMahon	2004:	30).	They	agree	
however	that	terms	such	as	‘ethics’	and	‘propriety’	were	used	sparingly	in	the	White	Paper.	Of	note	
amongst	 these	 initiatives	 was	 a	 proposal	 to	 set	 up	 an	 inter-institutional	 Advisory	 Committee	 on	
Standards	 in	 Public	 Life,	 an	 initiative	 which	 was	 ultimately	 dropped	 because	 of	 lack	 of	 support	
outside	 the	 Commission.	 A	 further	 initiative	 comprised	 the	 complete	 overhaul	 of	 the	 rules	 on	
whistleblowing.	
By	2002,	 there	was	a	 greater	willingness	 in	 the	Commission	 leadership	 to	 talk	more	openly	about	
ethics.	A	page	devoted	to	the	subject	appeared	on	the	Commission’s	reform	webpage.	The	content	
of	 this	 page	 suggested	 a	 preference	 for	 a	 prohibitive	 rule-based	 approach,	 emphasising	 both	
regulation	 and	 enforcement,	 even	 if	 this	 was	 allied	 with	 an	 assumption	 that	 over	 time	 the	 rules	
would	 alter	 the	 conduct	 and	 perhaps	 even	 the	 attitudes	 of	 officials	 (Kinnock	 2004:	 7-12).	 Further	
guidance	took	the	form	of	the	revised	‘Administrative	Guide	to	the	Conduct	Expected	of	Commission	
Officials’,	 produced	 in	November	2003.	The	guide	originated	with	 the	European	Ombudsman	who	
had	 been	 concerned	 about	 the	 lack	 of	 detail	within	 the	 Staff	 Regulations	 (European	Ombudsman	
2002).	In	the	context	of	the	reform	it	was	presented	as	a	response	to	Action	92	in	the	White	Paper	
covering	 sound	 project	 management.	 Yet	 again,	 this	 had	 the	 explicit	 aim	 of	 helping	 to	 raise	
awareness	of	ethics	and	standards	of	conduct	in	the	Union	(European	Commission	2004).	
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Throughout	this	period,	the	Commission	experienced	ongoing	criticism,	often	kept	in	public	view	by	
‘whistle-blowers’	 such	 as	 Paul	 van	 Buitenen	 and	Marta	Andreasen.	 This	 provided	 an	 ever	 present	
backdrop	to	the	reform	process,	but	also	tells	us	much	about	continuities	within	the	Commission’s	
culture.	 The	 Commission	 has	 always	 tended	 to	 be	 defensive	when	 attacked,	 and	 even	 after	 1999	
continued	to	take	a	strident	and	literal	approach	to	its	critics.	The	Commission’s	knee-jerk	reaction	
to	criticism	was	to	deny	it	and	then	go	on	the	counter-attack.	This	is	precisely	what	happened	when	
the	 Eurostat	 affair	 blew	 up.	 This	 complex	 scandal,	 which	 involved	 the	 setting	 up	 of	 illicit	 bank	
accounts	by	senior	Commission	officials	and	the	mismanagement	of	relations	between	Eurostat	and	
external	bodies,	preoccupied	the	‘Brussels	village’	over	much	of	2003	and	into	early	2004.	The	case	
reawakened	 earlier	 concerns	 about	 the	 Commission’s	 capacity	 to	 keep	 itself	 in	 check,	 and	 also	
showed	the	Commission	to	be	slow	 in	accepting	 that	 there	was	even	a	case	 to	answer	 (Cini	2007:	
90).	Belatedly,	in	response	to	the	Eurostat	affair,	the	Commission	produced	an	Action	Plan,	covering	
staff	mobility,	a	 revised	Code	of	Conduct	 for	Commissioners,	and	 the	 further	 strengthening	of	 the	
internal	audit	system,	as	well	as	the	setting	up	of	a	new	unit	on	‘Ethics’	in	the	Secretariat-General	to	
coordinate	ethics-related	issues	in	order	to	improve	the	flow	of	information	within	the	Commission	
(interviews	1	and	3).	
In	 sum,	 the	 period	 between	 1999	 and	 2004	was	 characterised	 by	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 ethics	
system	 for	 Commission	 officials.	 The	 primary	 modus	 operandi	 of	 this	 system	 was	 through	 rules	
directed	 at	 Commission	 officials,	 based	 on	 the	 logic	 that	 these	 rules	 would	 ultimately	 provoke	 a	
change	in	behaviour,	ensuring	high	ethical	standards	(Năstase	2013).	A	secondary	concern	was	that	
officials	 should	have	an	awareness	of	 the	 rules.	 This	new	ethics	 system	was	 integrated	within	 the	
wider	administrative	reform	process	which	was	driven	by	external	demands	placed	on	Commission	
leaders	 in	 the	period	 after	 the	Resignation.	 Yet,	 those	 in	 charge	of	 the	 reform	process	within	 the	
Commission	were	able	to	use	their	discretion	to	design	a	reform	(of	which	the	ethics	system	was	a	
component)	which	was	in	many	respects	surprising.	The	Reform	was	wide-ranging;	but,	perhaps	as	a	
corollary,	 it	 also	 played	 down	 the	 importance	 of	 ethical	 issues.	 Moreover,	 while	 the	 approach	 it	
adopted	 with	 regard	 to	 ethics	 was	 traditional,	 with	 a	 preference	 for	 regulation	 familiar	 to	
Commission	 officials,	 it	 did	 not	 speak	 to	 the	 cutting-edge	 research	 agendas	 of	 public	 ethics	
academics	nor	of	organisations	like	the	OECD.	
 
THE	EUROPEAN	COMMISSION’S	ETHICS	SYSTEM:	POST-FORMATIVE	CHANGE	2005-11	
In	 2005,	 the	 new	 Commissioner	 responsible	 for	 administrative	 affairs,	 Siim	 Kallas,	 saw	 an	
opportunity	 to	 make	 his	 mark	 by	 launching	 a	 package	 of	 initiatives	 under	 the	 rubric	 of	
‘transparency’,	 of	 which	 the	 ‘ethics	 of	 officials’	 was	 one	 element	 (Kallas	 2005).	 This	 took	 the	
Commission	by	 surprise.	While	Barroso	was	alert	 to	 the	need	 to	 respond	quickly	 to	ethics-related	
issues,	 administrative	 issues	 were	 not	 high	 on	 his	 agenda.	 Where	 ethical	 issues	 did	 capture	 his	
attention,	 they	 concerned	 the	 ethics	 of	 Commissioners.	 From	 the	 outset,	 Kallas’s	 approach	 was	
different	from	that	of	Kinnock.	As	Kallas	put	it:	
A	 strong	 ethical	 culture	 is	 a	 far	 more	 effective	 approach	 to	 eliminating	 the	 risk	 of	
inappropriate	action	than	the	creation	and	enforcement	of	more	rules.	We	need	to	find	the	
right	balance	between	 trust	based	on	a	 common	understanding	of	principles	of	behaviour	
and	supervision	of	respect	for	rules	(Kallas	2006).		
Henceforth	there	would	be	frequent	references	to	the	danger	of	having	too	many	rules,	reflecting	a	
post-reform	 discourse	 prevalent	 in	 the	 Commission	 that	 viewed	 the	 Kinnock	 reforms	 as	 overly	
bureaucratic	(Bauer	2008:	691-707).	
Within	Kallas’s	European	Transparency	 Initiative	 (ETI),	ethics	did	not	have	a	high	profile,	however,	
and	 little	 action	 was	 taken	 in	 the	 first	 years	 of	 the	 Barroso	 I	 Commission.	 The	 internal	 control	
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standards	were	revised,	with	the	total	number	reduced	from	24	to	16.	However,	the	ethics	standard	
was	 retained	 as	 the	 new	 ICS-2,	 albeit	 re-labelled	 as	 ‘ethical	 and	 organisational	 values’	 (European	
Commission	2007a).	With	the	ETI,	however,	the	first	step	taken	on	ethics	was	the	commissioning	of	
an	expert	report	on	the	ethics	of	high	office-holders.	The	call	was	drafted	by	BEPA,	the	Commission’s	
in-house	 ‘think	 tank’,	 in	 early	 2007	 and	 the	 project	 was	 completed	 by	 a	 multinational	 team	 of	
European	 academics	 the	 same	 year.	 The	 Report’s	 focus	 on	 high	 office-holders	 skewed	 the	 ethics	
agenda	 towards	 Commissioners	 and	 senior	 Commission	 officials	 (Demmke	 et	 al.	 2007),	 but	 its	
conclusions	did	allow	the	Commission	to	claim	that	the	Commission’s	ethical	rules	were	very	much	
in	 line	 with	 those	 in	 comparator	 organisations	 (European	 Commission	 2008).	 Beyond	 the	 upbeat	
headline,	the	Report	also	made	a	number	of	recommendations,	some	of	which	were	picked	up	in	a	
Commission	Communication	on	Ethics	approved	in	2008.	
The	 Commission	 has	 since	 been	 keen	 to	 emphasise	 that	 the	 content	 of	 the	 Commission	
Communication	(usually	known	as	the	Kallas	Communication),	was	inspired	by	an	‘Ethics	Day’	which	
was	 held	 in	 July	 2006	 at	 the	 instigation	 of	 the	 Secretary-General	 (European	 Commission	 2007b;	
European	Commission	2008).	The	Ethics	Day	brought	together	officials	with	an	interest	 in	ethics	to	
review	the	ethics	framework	and	discuss	practical	cases	and	dilemmas.	Together	with	the	results	of	
an	accompanying	survey	sent	out	to	all	Commission	officials	four	weeks	before	the	event,	and	which	
provoked	2707	responses	(Utrecht	School	of	Governance	2008:	44),	the	Commission	was	also	able	to	
claim	 that	 the	 ethics	 agenda	 had	 been	 shaped	 from	 the	 ‘bottom-up’	 (Kallas	 2006).	 This	 was	
important	 given	 the	 sensitivities	 around	 ethical	 issues.	 However,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 approach	
adopted	in	the	Communication	was	very	much	the	approach	also	advocated	in	the	expert	report.	In	
particular,	the	Report	had	suggested	that	there	was	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	more	rules	made	for	
a	better	ethics	system;	and	they	argued	that	more	attention	should	be	placed	on	integrity	measures.	
They	 also	 played	 down	 the	 importance	 of	 an	 inter-institutional	 framework	 (Demmke	 et	 al.	 2007:	
139-142)	 in	 the	 form	of	 an	 inter-institutional	 agreement,	which	would	 establish	 a	 common	 set	 of	
ethics	rules	across	the	EU	institutions,	with	an	inter-institutional	advisory	committee	playing	the	role	
of	arbiter	in	difficult	cases.	
After	 the	Ethics	Day,	a	working	group	was	set	up	 (European	Commission	2007b)	 to	consider	 three	
themes:	awareness-raising	and	ethics	policy;	the	clarification	of	rules/enforcement;	and	the	setting	
up	of	an	ethics	 infrastructure	and	 focal	point.	The	aim	of	 the	 initiative	was	not	 to	regulate,	but	 to	
‘enhance	the	environment	for	professional	ethics’	and	‘consolidate	and	promote	an	ethical	culture’	
in	order	to	create	a	modern,	coherent,	accessible	and	understandable	ethical	system.	The	initiative	
was	not	intended	to	replace	the	old	system,	but	to	supplement	it	(European	Commission	2008:	2-3).	
Even	so,	the	Communication	pushed	the	Commission’s	ethics	system	in	a	new	direction.	
The	 Communication	 brought	 together	 a	 number	 of	 ethics-related	 actions.	 It	 recommended	 the	
agreement	 of	 a	 Statement	 of	 Principles	 (a	 draft	 of	which	was	 included	 in	 the	 Communication);	 it	
proposed	major	 improvements	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 internal	 ethics	webpages;	 and	 it	 foresaw	 the	
development	of	new	ethics	training	programmes.	 It	recommended	the	establishment	of	a	network	
(infrastructure)	of	ethics	correspondents	across	the	Commission’s	services,	who	could	liaise	with	the	
‘centre’	 on	 ethical	 issues;	 and	 it	 also	 foresaw	 a	 one-stop	 shop	 online	 approval	 system	 for	
authorisation	 requests	 and	 the	 processing	 of	 declarations.	 Further	 clarification	 of	 the	 Staff	
Regulations	 in	 the	 form	 of	 new	 or	 revised	 Commission	 Decisions	 was	 recommended	 under	 the	
headings	 of	 ‘favours,	 gifts	 and	 hospitality’	 and	 ‘outside	 activities	 and	 assignments’,	 alongside	 a	
check-list	on	the	website	to	help	officials	identify	potential	or	actual	conflicts	of	interest	(European	
Commission	2008:	3-5).	The	Communication	was	seen	internally	as	a	low-key	administrative	matter,	
internal	 to	 the	 Commission,	 and	 of	 no	 particular	 interest	 outside	 it	 (interview	 1;	 Euractiv.com	 7	
March	2008).	Indeed,	in	the	absence	of	any	scandal,	little	attention	was	given	to	the	Communication	
at	the	time.	
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Between	2008	and	2011,	Kallas’s	cabinet	(and	 its	successor,	that	of	Maroš	Šefčovič),	together	with	
DG	 Human	 Resources	 and	 the	 Secretariat-General,	 worked	 to	 implement	 the	 initiatives	 set	 out	
within	the	Communication.	At	the	end	of	2008,	an	audit	was	conducted	by	the	Internal	Audit	Service	
(IAS)	 to	 judge	 whether	 the	 existing	 ICS	 on	 ethics	 was	 being	 implemented	 effectively	 (European	
Commission	2009).	Covering	two	horizontal	and	four	operational	services,	the	outcome	of	the	audit	
was	 positive,	 and	 its	 interim	 recommendations	 were	 much	 in	 line	 with	 the	 content	 of	 the	
Communication,	 allowing	 the	 Commission	 to	 get	 on	 with	 the	 job	 of	 implementation	 much	 as	 it	
would	otherwise	have	done	(DG	HR	2009:	14).	
This	was	not	a	particularly	speedy	process,	but	progress	was	made.	By	mid-2011	the	draft	Statement	
of	Principles	had	been	widely	discussed	and	was	posted	on	the	Commission’s	intranet,	though	it	was	
not	 formally	 approved	 or	 amended	 as	 had	 originally	 been	 planned.	 The	 network	 of	 ethics	
correspondents	was	 in	 place	 in	 2010,	 coordinated	 in	 the	 first	 instance	by	 IDOC,	 but	with	plans	 to	
move	this	 to	the	unit	 in	DG	HR	responsible	 for	ethics	 (interview	2;	 interview	4).	Diversity	of	ethics	
management	 practice	 across	 DGs	 was	 encouraged,	 as	 the	 Commission’s	 services	 designed	 ethics	
days	 and	 codes	 in	 line	with	 their	 own	policy	 needs.	 The	 new	ethics	website	 on	 the	 Commission’s	
intranet	 (MyIntraComm)	 was	 up-and-running	 by	 2009	 (DG	 HR	 2009).	 This	 included	 access	 to	 an	
internal	paper,	 the	Practical	Guide	 to	Ethics	 (European	Commission	2011),	explanatory	pages	on	a	
range	of	ethics	 issues	 (contained	 in	 the	Staff	Regulations),	and	a	series	of	 informative	case-studies	
(interview	2;	 interview	5).	The	one-stop	shop	 for	online	ethics	approvals	was	set	up,	but	 technical	
problems	 had	 delayed	 implementation,	 and	 as	 of	 early	 2011,	 only	 one	 online	 approval	 route	 (on	
outside	activities)	had	been	activated.	New	training	courses	were	also	drafted,	with	more	planned.	
Finally,	 work	 began	 to	 clarify	 the	 rules	 on	 favours,	 gifts	 and	 hospitality,	 and	 the	 revision	 of	 the	
existing	Commission	Decision	on	outside	activities	(DG	HR	2009;	DG	HR	2011;	interview	1;	interview	
2).	
A	parallel	development	which	came	out	of	 the	blue	was	 the	European	Ombudsman’s	 intervention	
into	 the	 field	 of	 Commission	 ethics	 in	 2010-11.	 The	Ombudsman’s	 goal	was	 to	 construct	 a	 set	 of	
public	 service	 principles	 (originally	 labelled	 ‘ethical	 principles’	 but	 this	 was	 dropped)	 for	 the	
European	 administration.	 An	 initial	 request	 for	 information	 from	 the	 European	 network	 of	
Ombudsmen	produced	various	options,	which	were	then	amalgamated	into	a	proposal	sent	out	for	
consultation	 in	 early	 2011	 (European	 Ombudsman	 2011).	 Although	 it	 was	 not	 the	 first	 time	 the	
European	Ombudsman	had	sought	to	influence	ethical	practices	in	the	EU	institutions,	this	initiative	
provoked	 a	 rather	 hostile	 response	 from	 within	 some	 quarters	 in	 the	 Commission	 as	 it	 failed	 to	
acknowledge	 that	 a	 similar	 exercise	 had	 already	 been	 initiated	 in-house.	 In	 the	 end,	 the	 initiative	
was	quietly	dropped.	
In	sum,	in	the	period	after	2005,	the	Commission’s	ethics	system	was	characterised	by	a	distaste	for	
regulation,	reflecting	wider	cultural	norms	asserted	by	organisational	leaders	within	the	Commission	
(also	echoed	in	the	negative	discourses	on	the	Kinnock	reforms,	as	well	as	the	top-down	hostility	to	
further	 institutional	 change	 in	 the	post-Lisbon	 Treaty	 period).	 The	 agenda	was	not	 a	 deregulatory	
one,	 but	 there	 was	 recognition	 that	 regulation	 alone	 was	 insufficient,	 and	 that	 it	 could	 even	 be	
counterproductive.	This	reflected	the	weak	position	of	the	Commission	externally.	As	well	as	greater	
emphasis	 placed	 on	 integrity	 measures,	 there	 was	 also	 a	 strong	 push	 on	 awareness	 of	 the	 rules	
(Năstase	2013).	
	
CONCLUSION	
This	article	examines	post-formative	and	formative	institutional	change	in	the	case	of	the	European	
Commission’s	ethics	system,	and	finds	that	both	structural	factors	and	agency,	external	and	internal	
to	the	Commission	were	important	in	both	periods.	This	conclusion	expands	on	the	claim,	and	adds	
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to	 it	 by	 reflecting	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 intensity	 in	 differentiating	 between	 these	 two	 stages	 of	
institutional	change.	
More	generally,	the	article	reflects	a	relatively	recent	phenomenon	within	EU	governance,	 labelled	
here	as	 its	 good	governance	 turn.	Whereas	 in	 the	period	 from	 the	 construction	of	 the	EEC	 to	 the	
early	1990s	little	emphasis	was	placed	on	quality	of	governance	issues	within	the	EU	institutions,	the	
good	 governance	 turn	 comprised	 a	 growing	 recognition	 by	 actors	 in	 the	 EU	 institutions	 that	 the	
democratic	deficit	formed	a	fault	line	running	through	the	integration	process.	Increasing	emphasis	
on	the	quality	of	governance	brought	principles	such	as	accountability,	transparency,	representation	
and	participation	to	the	top	of	the	EU’s	agenda,	while	also	opening	up	new	debates	on	efficiency	and	
effectiveness.	This	 led	 to	a	number	of	 initiatives,	 including	several	on	 the	public	ethics	of	 the	EU’s	
officials.	 Since	 the	 late	 1990s,	 within	 the	 Commission,	 two	 distinct	 periods	 in	 ethics	 policy	 were	
identified	 –	 that	 of	 1999-2004,	 a	 period	 of	 formative	 change	 characterised	 by	 a	 regulatory-
enforcement	approach;	and	2005-2011	where	the	focus	shifted	in	the	direction	of	a	softer	integrity-
orientated	approach	which	emphasised	implementation,	both	in	letter	and	spirit,	of	the	rules.	
So	what	can	we	learn	about	European	governance	from	this	account	of	the	formation	and	evolution	
of	a	public	ethics	system	in	the	Commission?	The	lessons	relate	primarily	to	the	way	in	which	new	
governance	systems	emerge,	and	how	they	evolve;	that	is,	they	concern	institutional	change.	Thus,	
moving	to	the	empirical	case,	the	article	distinguishes	between	the	formation	of	the	ethics	system	
on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 post-formative	 change,	 on	 the	 other.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 former,	 the	 ‘good	
governance	 turn’	 provided	 the	 broad	 external	 political	 context	 for	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 new	
system,	reinforcing	the	confidence	of	the	European	Parliament	 in	 its	attacks	on	the	Commission	 in	
the	 late	 1990s.	 The	 1999	 resignation	 crisis,	 which	 could	 not	 have	 happened	without	 this	 new	 EP	
confidence,	led	directly	to	the	administrative	reform	which	enabled	the	agreement	of	new	rules	that	
formed	the	foundation	of	the	new	ethics	system.	Within	the	Commission,	the	far	reaching	nature	of	
the	 reform	 allowed	 for	 new	 initiatives	 on	 public	 ethics,	 just	 as	 those	 opposed	 to	 such	 reforms	
became	morally	weaker	in	their	resistance	to	them.	Key	reform	leaders,	most	notably	Romano	Prodi	
and	Neil	Kinnock,	provided	the	necessary	 internal	 leadership	to	ensure	that	the	new	ethics	system	
would	 form	part	of	 the	wider	management	 reform	agenda.	 Therefore,	we	 see	 that	 to	understand	
formative	 change	 in	 this	 case,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 take	 into	 account	 not	 only	 the	 importance	 of	
external	 structural	 shocks	 and	 the	 external	 institutional	 context,	 and	 external	 actors,	 but	 also	
internal	factors,	in	terms	of	both	institutional	discretion	(if	only	up	to	a	point)	over	reform	content,	
and	the	leadership	of	key	reform	agents	(see	Figure	2).	
Figure	2:	Drivers	of	Ethics	Reform	(Formative)	
	 External	 Internal	
Structure	 Good	governance	turn;	major	
scandal,	leading	to	historic	reform	
Discretion	over	internal	reform	
(partial)	
Agency	 European	Parliament;	media		 Reform	agents	
 
At	 the	 post-formative	 stage,	 particularly	 in	 the	 period	 after	 2005,	 the	 external	 political	 context	
remained	 important	 as	 the	effects	of	 the	 ‘good	governance	 turn’	 continued	 to	be	 felt,	 and	as	 the	
European	Parliament	continued	to	wield	power	over	the	Commission.	As	in	the	late	1990s,	scandals	
(most	 notably	 Eurostat)	 were	 the	 external	 drivers	 of	 change,	 supplemented	 by	 the	 Parliament’s	
continuous	 push	 for	 further	 ethics-related	 reforms	 as	 a	 way	 of	 enhancing	 their	 control	 over	 the	
Commission.	A	growing	antipathy	to	regulation	within	the	Commission	supported	the	use	of	a	softer	
approach	 to	 the	 management	 of	 ethics.	 The	 use	 of	 soft	 instruments	 meant	 that	 there	 were	 no	
internal	 institutional	 barriers	 to	 reform	 as	 new	 initiatives	 could	 easily	 be	 developed	 and	
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implemented	with	little	opposition.	This	has	much	in	common	with	the	parallel	development	of	new	
governance	modes,	including	those	that	fall	under	the	rubric	of	the	Open	Method	of	Coordination.	
The	arrival	of	a	new	Commissioner,	Siim	Kallas,	who	was	keen	to	make	his	mark	on	the	Commission	
despite	a	rather	lacklustre	portfolio,	and	his	decision	to	include	ethics	in	his	European	Transparency	
Initiative	 also	 generated	 momentum	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 further	 reforms	 (even	 if	 these	 were	 not	
implemented	with	any	haste)	(see	Figure	3).		
Figure	3:	Drivers	of	Ethics	Reform	(Post-Formative)	
	 External	 Internal	
Structure	 Good	governance	agenda;	scandal	 Growing	antipathy	to	regulation	
Agency	 European	Parliament;media		 New	Commissioner,	Siim	Kallas	
 
Therefore,	 we	 see	 in	 explaining	 post-formative	 change	 that	 here	 too	 both	 internal	 and	 external	
drivers	were	important,	as	were	both	structural	factors	and	reform	agency.	What	differed	of	course	
was	 precisely	 how	 they	mattered,	 or	 to	 put	 it	 differently	 the	 particular	qualities	 of	 the	 factors	 at	
work.	The	crucial	difference	was	 the	 intensity	of	 the	 initial	external	 shock,	which,	 coupled	with	all	
the	other	relevant	factors,	made	(trans-)	formation	more	likely.		
What	 then	might	be	 the	broader	 implications	of	 this	 research,	 given	 the	emphasis	 in	many	of	 the	
contributions	in	this	volume	on	European	governance	from	the	perspective	of	power	dynamics	and	
inter-institutional	balance?	It	is	certainly	possible	to	argue	that	reforms	within	the	Commission	have	
allowed	that	 institution	to	inhabit	a	moral	high-ground	vis-à-vis	the	other	EU	institutions	that	have	
been	slower	and	more	reluctant	to	engage	with	such	reform.	But	there	is	little	evidence	of	such	an	
argument	carrying	weight	outside	of	academic	circles.	 In	practice,	 the	 reforms	 introduced	to	date,	
together	 with	 increasing	 pressure	 from	 activist	 NGOs,	 have	 served	 to	 strengthen	 the	 European	
Parliament’s	 resolve	 over	 gaps	 and	 weaknesses	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 ethics	 system.	 Although	
evidence	on	 this	point	 is	 scant,	 it	 seems	unlikely	 that	 the	Commission’s	 reputation	will	 have	been	
strengthened	as	a	consequence	of	engaging	in	this	good	governance	turn.	Although	after	2011	the	
ethics	agenda	continued	under	a	new	Commissioner,	Maroš	Šefčovič,	 the	 latter	 taking	 forward	his	
predecessor’s	 transparency	agenda,	 the	Euro	 crisis	 seemed	 to	draw	attention	away	 from	 the	EU’s	
good	governance	initiatives.	Whether	this	is	a	temporary	measure	remains	to	be	seen.	
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